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NEW & REVISED POLICING 
STANDARDS RELEASED
On January 18, 2021, British 
Columbia introduced a new 
Provincial Policing Standard 
related to Restraints while the 
s t a n d a r d r e l a t e d t o 
Intermediate  Weapons was updated. The chief 
constable, chief officer or commissioner of a police 
force must ensure their policies and procedures are 
consistent with the standards. New and reviewed 
standards include the following. 
Restraints - 1.2.3
This new standard requires officers to 
only  use restraints that have been 
approved by the Director of Police 
Services. A “restraint”  is defined as 
“any mechanical device or system that when used in 
its ordinary and intended manner restricts the 
normal physical activity or range of motion of an 
individual in part or in whole”.
Training 
Before being authorized to carry and use a restraint, 
the officer must successfully complete a  training 
course  and be qualified to use the restraint (1.2.3(4)) 
and requalified at least once every three years 
(1.2.3(5)).  Written records must also be maintained 
of the restraints training 
and requalif ication 
courses completed by 
each officer (1.2.3(6). 
Restraints must also be 
maintained in good 
working order (1.2.3 
(2)).
Storage
Restraints must be securely stored when not in use 
(1.2.3(3)).
Off-Duty Carry
An officer may carry their issued restraints “only 
when on assigned duty, unless otherwise authorized 
in writing or described in policy” (1.2.3(7)).
Approved Restraints
The following approved restraints are listed in 
Appendix A of the standard:
• Handcuffs
• Leg Restraints
• Disposable Restraint Device
• Whole Body Restraints
• Spit Hoods/Masks
Continued on p. 7
Volume 21 Issue 2~ March/April 2021
PAGE 2
National Library of Canada 
Cataloguing in Publication 
Data
Main entry under title:
In service: 10-8. -- Vol. 1, no. 1 (June 2001)  
  Monthly
  Title from caption.
  “A newsletter devoted to operational police 
officers across British Columbia.”
       ISSN 1705-5717 = In service, 10-8
1. Police - British Columbia - Periodicals. 2. 
Police - Legal status, laws, etc. - Canada - 
Cases - Periodicals. I. Justice Institute of 
British Columbia. Police Academy. II. Title: In 
service, 10-8. III. Title: In service, ten-eight.
Highlights In This Issue
Bachelor Of Law Enforcement Studies 4
Evidence Admitted Despite Exceeding Authority Of 
Implied Licence Doctrine
14
Ability To Apply For Warrant Not To Be Confused 
With Requirement To Do So
20
Destroyed Items Results In Exclusion Of Critical 
Evidence
23
Entry Onto Private Property Justified 26
No Expectation Of Privacy In Car Rental 
Information
29
Reasonable Grounds Less Than Balance Of 
Probabilities
32
Police Reported Hate Crime In Canada, 2019 35
Time From Charge To Arrest Attributable To Crown 
Delay
36
‘Accident’ Includes Intentionally Striking A 
Pedestrian
37
National DNA Databank Statistics Released 38
Unless otherwise noted all articles are authored by 
Mike  Novakowski, MA, LLM. The articles contained 
herein are provided for information purposes only 
and are not to be construed as legal or other 
professional advice. The opinions expressed herein 
are not necessarily  the opinions of the Justice 
Institute of British Columbia. “In Service: 10-8” 
welcomes your comments or contributions to this 
newsletter.   
Law Enforcement Studies Diploma
Be the one making a difference  and keeping 
communities safe. If you want to gain the applied 
skills to be a sought-after graduate pursuing a 
rewarding career in law enforcement and public 
safety, then this program is for you.
Click Here
Law Enforcement Studies Degree
If you have a relevant diploma, and are interested in 
obtaining an applied degree to pursue a law 
enforcement or public  safety career, then this 
program is for you. This program builds on previous 
relevant studies with an applied degree, and is 
designed to increase your chances of success.
Click Here
Post-Baccalaureate Diploma in 
Disaster Management
Be the one in a dynamic and growing field keeping 
communities safe. If you have a bachelor's degree 
and are interested in pursuing and advancing your 
career in the fields of disaster and emergency 
management, this program is for you.
Click Here
Certificate in Emergency 
Management
Be the one advancing  your career. If you are 
interested in a career in emergency management, 
currently work as an emergency manager, or are a 
first responder or public safety  professional looking 
to move into an emergency management role, this 
program is for you.
Click Here
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WHAT’S NEW FOR POLICE IN 
THE LIBRARY
The Justice Institute of British Columbia Library is an 
excellent resource for learning. Here is a list of its 
recent acquisitions which may be of interest to 
police. 
The business of pandemics: the COVID-19 story.
edited by Jay Liebowitz.
Boca Raton; London; New York: CRC Press, 2021.
Available in eBook format only (JIBC login required)
A coach's guide to developing exemplary leaders: 
making the most of the leadership challenge and 
the leadership practices inventory (LPI). 
James M. Kouzes, Barry Z. Posner & Elaine Biech.
San Francisco, CA: The Leadership Challenge, A 
Wiley Brand, 2017.
HD 30.4 K68 2017
Competencies for effective leadership: a 
framework for assessment, education, and 
research.
edited by Ralph A. Gigliotti.
United Kingdom: Emerald Publishing, 2019.
Available in eBook format only (JIBC login required)
Crisis ahead: 101 ways to prepare for and bounce 
back from disasters scandals and other 
emergencies.
Edward Segal.
Boston, MA: Nicholas Brealey Publishing, 2020.
HD 49 S44 2020
Cybersecurity for everyone.
David B. Skillicorn.
Boca Raton: CRC Press, 2021.
QA 76.9 A25 S55 2021
Decision making and problem solving: break 
through barriers and banish uncertainty at work.
John Adair.
London; New York, NY: Kogan Page, 2019.
HD 30.23 A43 2019
Epidemics and the modern world.
Mitchell L. Hammond.
Toronto; Buffalo; London: University  of Toronto 
Press, 2020.
Available in eBook format only (JIBC login required)
Ethical decision-making: cases in organization 
and leadership.
edited by Patricia A. Mitchell
Gorham, ME : Myers Education Press, 2019
Available in eBook format only (JIBC login required)
How mediation works: resolving conflict through 
talk.
Angela Garcia.
Cambridge, UK; New York, NY: Cambridge 
University Press, 2019.
HM 1126 G36 2019
Also available in eBook format (JIBC login required)
Opening doors to diversity in leadership.
Bobby Siu.
Toronto; Buffalo; London: University  of Toronto 
Press, 2021.
Available in eBook format only (JIBC login required)
Stereotypes: the incidence and impacts of bias.
edited by Joel T. Nadler & Elora C. Voyles.
Santa Barbara, CA; Denver, CO: Praeger, 2020.
Available in eBook format only (JIBC login required)
Strengths-based approaches to crime and 
substance use: from drugs and crime to 
desistance and recovery.
edited by David Best and Charlotte Colman.
Abingdon, Oxon ; New York, NY: Routledge, 2020.
HV 8836.5 S77 2020
What works now?: evidence-informed policy and 
practice.
edited by Annette Boaz, Huw Davies, Alec Fraser & 
Sandra Nutley.
Bristol: Policy Press, 2019.
H 97 W44 2019
BACHELOR OF LAW 
ENFORCEMENT STUDIES (BLES) 
 Get Ahead of the Competition
Today’s law enforcement and public safety environment is complex. Employees in public and private 
organizations are increasingly being called upon to perform inspections, investigations, security 
supervision, enforcement and regulatory compliance functions. The Bachelor of Law Enforcement 
Studies (BLES) provides expanded opportunities in the study of law enforcement and public safety 
and will position you to be a sought-after candidate in a highly competitive recruiting environment. Our 
education program will prepare you for success by developing your leadership skills, and enhancing your 
interpersonal communications, critical thinking and ethical decision making.




WHO SHOULD TAKE THIS PROGRAM
• Graduates of JIBC’s two-year Law Enforcement 
Studies Diploma (LESD) or applicants a diploma 
or associate degree in a related field can 
begin in the third year of the Bachelor of Law 
Enforcement Studies program. 
• Applicants who have completed a peace officer 
training program with a minimum of three years 
full-time service in a recognized public safety 
agency with a Prior Learning Assessment 
that would allow for 60 credits to be granted 
towards completion of the degree program.
• police officer
• conservation officer 
• animal cruelty officer
• border services agency 
official 
• fraud investigator
• by-law enforcement officer 
• regulatory enforcement 
officer
• gaming investigator 
• correctional officer 
• deputy sheriff 
• intelligence services officer
• probation officer
CAREER FLEXIBILITY
The program will provide you with the in-depth knowledge, expanded skills and competencies to seek 
employment in a wide range of law enforcement, public safety, regulatory, and compliance fields offering 
you more career flexibility and professional development. Examples of potential roles include:
WHAT WILL I LEARN?
This comprehensive program will prepare you to contribute to a just and fair society as a member within a 
variety of criminal justice and public safety professions. Graduates will obtain:
• An in-depth knowledge of the Canadian criminal justice system. 
• Analysis and reasoning skills informed by theory and research.
• Skills required to effectively work within a law enforcement agency. 
BACHELOR OF LAW ENFORCEMENT STUDIES (BLES) 
CURRICULUM AT A GLANCE
Courses in years one and two are offered through the Law Enforcement Studies Diploma. Years 
three and four build on these courses to complete the degree. Students can pursue their third 
and fourth year studies full-time or part-time to complete the final 60 credits.  
Year 3
• Criminal & Deviant Behaviour
• Comparative Criminal Justice
• Leadership in a Law Enforcement Environment
• Search & Seizure Law in Canada
• Organizational Behaviour
• Investigations & Forensic Evidence
• Restorative Justice
• Project Management
• Data & Research Management 
Year 4
• Aboriginal People and Policy
• Multiculturalism, Conflict and Social Justice
• Administrative and Labour Law in Canada
• Applied Research in Public Safety and Law 
Enforcement
• Professional Practice in Justice and Public Safety
• Crisis Intervention
• Research Project
• Governance and Accountability in Law 
Enforcement
• Terrorism and Society
• Organized Crime and Society  
PROGRAM FORMAT
Students can pursue their studies full-time at the New Westminster campus or online. The full-
time on-campus format consists of 60 credits completed over two years with courses over the 
fall and winter semesters (five courses per semester). The online format consists of 60 credits 
that must be completed within five years with the flexibility to take courses in the fall, winter 
and spring-summer semesters.
HOW TO APPLY?
Credit for the first two years of BLES will be granted to students who meet the program’s 
admission requirements. For details on admission requirements and application deadlines 
please visit our website at jibc.ca/bles.
715 McBride Boulevard 
New Westminster, BC V3L 5T4 
Canada
Justice Institute of British 
Columbia (JIBC) is Canada’s 
leading public safety educator 
recognized nationally and 
internationally for innovative 
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BCFirstRespondersMentalHealth.com
IT’S TIME TO SPEAK UP ABOUT MENTAL HEALTH.
















































For more resources on better understanding mental health in the context of the 
experiences and pressures of first responders, as well as the broader population, 
visit the following link.
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Handcuffs
H a n d c u f f s a r e 
“restraint devices 
designed to secure 
an i nd iv idua l ' s 
wrists in proximity 
t o e a ch o t h e r. 
Comprised of two 
ring-shaped cuffs, linked together by a short 
chain. Each cuff has a rotating arm which engages 
with a ratchet that prevents it from being opened 
once closed around a person’s wrist. Once applied, 
the cuff can only be removed by key.” 
Approved Specifications
• May be fabricated of metal or rigid carbon fiber 
materials.
• Must have a double lock feature on each cuff.
• Joined by a length of chain, each end attached 




Training in the use of handcuffs must include the 
following safety components:
• The officer must check each applied Restraint 
device  for a safe  level of tightness, in that 
circulation will not be dangerously restricted; 
and
• The double lock mechanism must be 
immediately engaged in all applications; or
 
• When the officer reasonably perceives that 
violent subject behaviour makes engaging the 
double lock mechanism too difficult at that time, 
the officer shall engage the mechanism as soon 
as is practicable after the violent behaviour 
subsides or the officer(s) have established 
sufficient control of the subject (1.2.3(4)(a)).
Leg Restraints
Leg  Restraints are  “a  device used to restrict the 
movements of an individual's legs when exhibiting 
violent behavior. They can also be used on a 
subject's legs during transport when a greater risk 
of violence or escape is suspected.” Leg Restraints 
are commonly referred to as leg irons. 
Approved Specifications
• May be fabricated of metal, rigid carbon fiber 
material, or nylon strapping with affixed cam-
lock or alligator clip buckles. 
• Must have a double lock feature on each cuff.
• Joined by a length of chain, each end attached 
to a 360-degree swivel pin, no longer that 20 
inches. 
• May also be fabricated of a one to two inch 
wide single strap of nylon material, formed into 
a loop through a cam-lock or alligator clip 
buckle which is used to secure the subject's legs
1.2.3 Appendix A
Training
Training in the leg restraints must include the same 
safety components as handcuffs (tightness check 
and engagement of its double-lock mechanism) 
(1.2.3(4)(b)). In addition, leg restraints “can be  used 
in conjunction with handcuffs and full body 
Restraints, but the two devices cannot be joined by 
any means to complete a maximal Restraint or 
‘hog tie’” (1.2.3(4) (c)).
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 Whole Body Restraint Devices
Whole Body Restraint Devices are “more 
complicated to apply than traditional Restraints, 
requiring multiple personnel, and consist of 
several Restraints that more greatly affect the 
ability of the subject to move. These Restraint 
devices are reserved for use on high risk, violent or 
self-harming subjects.” 
Approved Specifications
• A shoulder harness, a binding for the ankles, 
and a blanket with straps that encircles and 
restrains the legs. The harness and the ankle 
strap attach to loops on the blanket with 
carabiners, which helps to keep subjects from 
moving.
• A flat board with multiple point Restraint 
systems and a pillow to protect the head. The 
board is coated for easy cleaning and the 
runners on the bottom elevate the board for easy 
access to multiple handles.
• A specially  built chair on at least two wheels 
with soft Restraint straps intended to help 
control the arms, legs, and torso of violent, self-
destructive subjects.
 
• A garment shaped like a jacket with long sleeves 
that surpass the tips of the  wearer's fingers and 
cross the arms against the wearer’s chest. The 
ends of the sleeves are ties to the back of the 
jacket, ensuring the arms are close to the chest 
with as little movement as possible. Its most 
typical use is restraining people who may cause 
harm to themselves or others.
• A belt of two to six inches wide that is secured 
in the back using a lockable main buckle and 
has two hand Restraint tethers with smaller 
lockable buckles that allow for one-way 
restricted movement and have a single handcuff 
on each side that is equipped with a double  lock 
feature. All locks are released with a standard 
handcuff key. The Hand Restraint Waist Belt 
enables an escorting officer to control a subject’s 
movement while allowing the subject enough 
movement to be fingerprinted, use  the bathroom 
facilities, eat, and/or perform other required 
movements for transport and processing. This 
device comes in two sizes: 
➡ Standard belt fits 29 to 58-inch waists; and 
➡ Smaller fits 23 to 40-inch waists. 
(1.2.3 Appendix A)
Training
Training in whole body restraint devices must 
include the same safety components as handcuffs 
(tightness check and engagement of its double-lock 
mechanism) (1.2.3(4)(a)).
Disposable Restraint Device
Disposable Restraint Devices are “designed to be a 
back-up handcuffs and a fast means of securing 
prisoners in a mass arrest situation. These one-
time use handcuffs can be made from various 
materials and are disposable after one use as they 
must be cut from the subject’s wrists using an 
appropriate cutting tool.” 
Approved Specifications
• Made of disposable one-time use nylon braid, 
thin plastic fastening straps where two straps can 
be tethered together to form one pair of 
disposable restraints, and/or commercially 
produced plastic handcuffs that are disposed of 
after one use. 
(1.2.3 Appendix A)
Training
Training in disposable restraint devices must 
include checking “each applied Restraint device 
for a safe level of tightness, in that circulation will 
not be dangerously restricted” and “at least one 
officer present with a subject(s) wearing a 
disposable restraint device must have a tool 
suitable for cutting and removing the device in 
their possession” (1.2.3(4)(b)). 
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Spit Hood/Mask
Spit hoods or masks are “devices intended to cover 
the mouth, face and sometimes the head of a 
restrained person in order to prevent them spitting 
bodily fluids at or biting others.” 
Approved Specifications
• Approved models are made of a light-weight 
nylon mesh-type fabric and are designed to fit 
comfortably over the head and neck. They must 
allow the subject the ability to see out and 
officers to see the subject’s face. 
• Spit hoods must not restrict the subject’s ability 
to breath while helping to restrict the expulsion 
of body fluids from the subject to other persons 
nearby. 
• Certain approved models can be affixed under 
the arms for additional security but must never 
be secured around the wearer’s neck. 
• The design and fabrication of this device must 
allow bodily fluids from the nose and mouth of 
the subject to drain without significant pooling 
which could lead to asphyxiation. Models that 
are fabricated of non-breathable materials and 
allow pooling of bodily fluids within the device 
are not approved for use by police. 
(1.2.3 Appendix A)
Training
Officers shall be trained that spit hoods or spit 
masks “must not be used on any person who is 
unconscious, vomiting or noticeably bleeding from 
the mouth or nose causing a risk  of respiratory 
distress or asphyxiation, or in obvious need of 
medical attention” and “shall be immediately 
removed from a subject who loses consciousness 
or develops any [the above] difficulties.”  In 
addition, “anyone wearing a spit hood shall be 
kept under the constant supervision of 
t r a i n e d p e r s o n n e l a n d t h e i r 
observations of the subject wearing the 
spit hood must be recorded in writing 
in five-minute intervals” (1.2.3(4)(b)). 
Intermediate Weapons - 1.2.2
This revised standard now requires only 
intermediate weapons that have  been approved by 
the Director of Police Services to be carried or 
used. The following approved intermediate 
weapons are listed in Appendix A of the standard:
• Baton (Expandable/Collapsible/Straight)
• Conducted Energy Weapon (CEW)
• Oleoresin Capsicum (OC) or Pepper Spray
• CS or Tear GasLess-Lethal Disbursement Device
• Extended Range Impact Weapons/Kinetic Energy 
Impact Projectile
• Pepper Ball
• E x t e n d e d R a n g e L a u n ch e r ( G a s a n d 
Disbursement Device) and Launching Cup 
Adapter With Launching Cartridge
• Distraction Devices
Baton
• An expandable/collapsible baton is a cylindrical 
club with a cylindrical outer shaft containing 
telescoping inner shafts that lock into each other 
when expanded. One end section has a foam or 
similar grip surface. The last section has a 
weighted cap at the striking tip. The sections 
open with manual or centrifugal force and lock 
together with a friction lock or locking collars at 
each joint. The sections release with either a 
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spring-loaded button or by manually generated 
downward force, striking  the tip on a hard 
surface. It is carried in a scabbard on the belt of 
police officers and used as a compliance tool 
and defensive weapon by police officers. 
• A straight baton is a one-piece cylindrical club 
that is carried as a compliance tool and 
defensive weapon by police officers. 
1.2.2 Appendix A
Approved Specifications
• Expandable/collapsible and straight batons are 
fabricated from metal or other rigid material and 




• A w e a p o n t h a t w h e n 
d i s c h a r g e d u s e s a 
conducted electrical current 
in order to incapacitate a 
person, or to generate 
compliance through pain. 
1.2.2 Appendix A
Approved Specifications
• Provincial Policing Standard 1.3.2 identifies 
approved CEW models. Currently the models 
identified are the TASER® X26 and TASER® 
X26P (1.3.2(1)).
Further specifications to approved CEW models 
include:
• Attach one cartridge only, have a single 
horizontal laser sight, fixed rear and front 
mechanical sights, and an ambidextrous safety 
switch. 
• Fire two probes by expelling compressed 
nitrogen capsules, from a single use detachable 
cartridge which are attached by  up to 25 feet of 
conductive wires. The top probe travels 
horizontally in line with the laser sight while the 
bottom probe travels downward at an eight-
degree angle to the intended target. 
• May also be deployed in direct contact with the 
intended subject, with the cartridge on or 
removed. 
1.2.2 Appendix A
OC or Pepper Spray
• Oleoresin Capsicum (OC) Spray is 
an oily organic resin derived from 
the fruit of plants in the Capsicum 
genus, such as chilli peppers. 
When the plants are finely 
ground, capsicum oleoresin is 
formed after the extraction process 
of capsaicin us ing organic 
solvents such as ethanol. This 
agent can be delivered in many forms. 
1.2.2 Appendix A




• Blast Dispersion Cartridge: Delivers a  cloud of 
micro pulverized OC powder. 
• Micro Pulverized Dust Disbursement Device/
Ferret: Are free from the effects of fire, 
concussion, or fragmentation. Can be thrown, 
launched, or air-dropped and has a  variable 
expulsion delay mechanism, which, when fired, 
drives a piston forcing the micro pulverized 
capsaicin dust payload through a machined 
discharge port. These forms are  also capable of 
penetrating structures. 
• Aerosol Projector: Contains a substance 
enclosed under pressure and able to be released 
as a fine  spray, typically by means of a 
propellant gas. 
• Fog: A spray pattern that is denser than aerosol.
 
• Pepper Foam: A uniquely formulated OC 
solution in which the OC is encapsulated with a 
surfactant, giving it a rigid jet foam dispersion. 
1.2.2 Appendix A
CS or Tear Gas
• C S i s t h e c o m m o n n a m e f o r 
orthochlorbenzalmalononitrile, a fine white 
powder, about the consistency of talcum 
powder, and it must be spread with some type of 
dispersing agent. CS Gas is commonly referred 




• Blast Dispersion Cartridge: Designed to deliver 
a cloud of micro pulverized CS "tear gas" irritant 
powder. 
• Micro Pulverized Dust Disbursement Device/
Ferret: Are free from the effects of fire, 
concussion, or fragmentation. Can be thrown, 
launched, or air-dropped and has a  variable 
expulsion delay mechanism, which, when fired, 
drives a piston which forces the micro 
pulverized capsaicin dust payload through a 
machined discharge port. These forms are also 
capable of penetrating structures.
 
• Aerosol: A substance enclosed under pressure 
and able to be released as a fine spray, typically 
by means of a propellant gas. 
• Fog: A spray pattern that is denser than aerosol. 
1.2.2 Appendix A
Less-Lethal Disbursement Device
• Less-Lethal Disbursement Devices are most 
commonly used in tac t ica l or c rowd 
management situations and are designed with 
indoor/outdoor operations in mind. They are 
most effective when used in confined areas and 
close to the target area to minimize the risks to 
all parties through pain compliance, temporary 
discomfort and/or incapacitation of potentially 
violent or dangerous subjects. Less-Lethal 
Disbursement Devices can discharge small 
rubber or plastic pellets, irritant gasses (OS, CS), 
or smoke. 
• Disbursement Devices can be hand thrown, 
launched, or OC/CS irritant and smoke 
Disbursement Devices can also be inserted 
through structural barriers using a gas injector 
unit. 
1.2.2 Appendix A
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Approved Specifications
• Approved models may have a body composed 
either of sheet steel with emission holes on the 
top and bottom capable  of discharging OC/CS 
irritants, or smoke (available  in many colours), 
or a rubber body containing a fuse, a separating 
fuse body, a black powder separation charge, a 
pressed black powder delay, a  bursting charge of 
flash powder, or rubber pellets. 
• Approved launchers include an attachment to 
12 gauge, 37 or 40-mm launchers. 
• Approved “Gas Injector Units” attach to the end 
of a ram bar at the  front of a tactical vehicle  and 
are designed to penetrate the surface of a 
structure with a  steel jackhammer “needle” and 
inject agents, including smoke, into a structure. 
1.2.2 Appendix A
Extended Range Impact Weapons/
Kinetic Energy Impact Projectile
• Extended Range Impact Weapon (ERIW): The 
ERIW consist of a device firing a special 
projectile designed to gain compliance, 
overcome resistance, or prevent serious injury or 
death. 
• Kinetic Energy  Impact Projectile (KEIP): Flexible 
or non-flexible projectiles, which are intended 
to gain compliance or incapacitate a subject 
through pain compliance, with a reduced 
potential for causing death or serious injury 
when properly used. 
1.2.2 Appendix A
Approved Specifications
• Approved models include multi or single-shot 
launchers in 12 gauge, 37 or 40mm capable of 
discharging the following approved munitions: 
• “RUBBER & PLASTIC BULLETS or PELLET 
ROUNDS” are solid spherical, or cylindrical 
projectiles capable of being discharged from the 
12 gauge, 37 or 40mm launchers, and fired as 
single shots or in groups of multiple projectiles. 
Approved projectiles are made of rubber, 
plastic, PVC, or composite materials. 
• “SPONGE ROUNDs” are projectiles that limit 
penetration of the projectile  into the skin by 
having a tip or nose that is slightly softer. Sponge 
rounds are constructed with a hard foam nose or 
attenuated energy (collapsing on impact) 
projectiles with a  hollow nose and are available 
in 37 and 40mm sizes. 
• “BEAN BAG ROUNDS” also known as flexible 
batons, are synthetic cloth bags made of cotton 
and Kevlar filled with small bird shot pellets. The 
bags are fitted into a plastic 12 GA cartridge and 
expand to shape when deployed presenting a 
consistent aerodynamic shape.  
1.2.2 Appendix A
Extended Range Launcher (Gas & 
Disbursement Device) & Launching 
Cup Adapter with Launching Cartridge 
• Such launchers are also often known as “gas 
guns” due to their original use by police for 
launching  tear gas projectiles. Launching cup 
adapters with launching cartridges allow the 
long-range use of smoke, OC, and CS 
Disbursement Devices (which would normally 
be thrown) to be launched from the 37mm, 
40mm launchers as well as 12-gauge shotguns. 
• “Disbursement Device” used in this context are 
all less-lethal munitions and not designed to 
cause death or dismemberment as in the 
primary function of military Disbursement 
Devices. 
1.2.2 Appendix A
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Approved Specifications
• Approved models must be 12 gauge, 37 or 
40mm launching systems for less- lethal 
ammunition. Launching cup adapters can be 
added to some of these launchers and with the 
use of a launching cartridge, Disbursement 
Devices can be deployed at greater distances. 
1.2.2 Appendix A
Pepper Ball
• Pepper balls are a projectile filled with irritant 
compounds, launched from a device like a 
paintball gun. They are designed to create a 
cloud of irritant designed to affect the eyes, nose 
and throat of the people who are exposed to the 
cloud. Pepper ball projectiles can also be inert, 
in that there is no irritant dispersed. 
1.2.2 Appendix A
Approved Specifications
• Approved models include multi-shot launchers 
similar to paintball guns, capable of discharging 
the following approved munitions: 
➡ .68 calibre pellets with a semi-rigid 
breakable outer shell and are filled with OC 
resin, CS powder, PAVA resin, water, or a 
liquid marking dye. 
➡ .68 calibre window breaking pellets that are 




• A Flash Bang Diversionary Device (FBDD), also 
known as a Noise Flash Diversionary Device 
(NFDD) is a less-lethal explosive device used to 
temporarily disorient a subject's senses. 
1.2.2 Appendix A
Approved Specifications
• Approved models produce: 
➡ A temporarily blinding flash of light not 
exceeding eight million candelas for ten 
milliseconds; and 
➡ A loud “bang” causing temporary disruption 
of hearing, not exceeding 175 decibels at 
five feet. 
• Approved models are available in single use or 
reloadable  devices with single or multiple  blast 
capability. 
1.2.2 Appendix 
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EVIDENCE ADMITTED DESPITE 
EXCEEDING AUTHORITY OF 
IMPLIED LICENCE TO KNOCK
R. v. Babich, 2020 SKCA 139
A 7-Eleven store clerk observed the 
accused, who appeared to be 
intoxicated, get into a  car and drive 
away with a child. The clerk smelled a 
strong odour of alcohol and noticed 
the accused was abrupt with the child. The clerk 
provided the licence plate number of the car. 
Police identified its registered owner and an 
associated address. A police officer went to the 
accused’s house. Lights were on in the house  but 
the officer did not see the car. There was, however, 
a garage with its doors closed.
The officer, not knowing if the suspect vehicle was 
in the garage, was concerned about the safety of 
the child if the vehicle was still being driven 
around. The officer knocked on the front door to 
the home and the accused answered it. She  had a 
young child in her arms, and identified herself as 
the person who had been driving the car. The 
officer detected a strong odour of alcohol coming 
from the accused and noted that she spoke slowly 
and had glossy eyes. In response to questioning, the 
accused said she had just come from the 7-Eleven 
and had consumed “a couple of drinks”. The officer 
told the accused that there were reasonable 
grounds to suspect she had been driving while her 
ability was impaired and an approved screening 
device  (ASD) demand would be made. The accused 
gave the child to a nanny inside the  house while 
the officer followed her inside to do so. Once the 
child was given to the nanny, the officer 
immediately read the ASD demand. The accused 
then accompanied the officer outside the house to 
the police car on the street. The accused refused to 
comply with the  demand, saying she needed her 
lawyer present. After five minutes of conversation, 
the accused was arrested for refusing to provide an 
ASD sample, she was handcuffed, and placed in 
the back of the police car. She was released on an 
appearance notice and returned to her house. The 
accused was subsequently  charged with refusing 
the ASD demand and impaired driving.
Saskatchewan Provincial Court
The accused sought the exclusion of all 
evidence obtained from the point police 
attended her home including all 
evidence of impairment against her, 
evidence of her refusal to provide a breath sample, 
and any other remedy the judge saw fit. 
The judge ruled the accused’s s. 8 Charter rights 
had been breached. Citing R. v. Rogers, 2016 SKCA 
105, the  judge found the officer was investigating a 
possible  Criminal Code offence when she went to 
the accused’s house searching for a person and a 
vehicle, and her sole  purpose in going to the door 
of the  residence was to engage the accused in a 
conversation to obtain the identity of the driver and 
grounds to make an ASD demand. “[The officer] 
testified in cross-examination that she  told [the 
accused] she was investigating an impaired driving 
complaint and that she was watching the person to 
get evidence, such as her speech and actions,”  said 
the judge. The officer had “no lawful authority to 
conduct a  search at the entrance to the house nor 
to enter the house without permission.” In the 
judge’s view, the police exceeded the authority 
conferred by the implied licence to knock doctrine. 
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Applying s. 24(2), the trial judge excluded the 
evidence. First, the judge found the breach to be 
serious. The officer entered the accused’s home 
without consent or invitation and followed her 
around. When other officers arrived, the accused 
was handcuffed and initially requested to go down 
to the police station. Second, the judge concluded 
that the impact of the s. 8 breach on the accused 
was serious. “It affected the accused’s privacy, 
liberty, and human dignity,” said the judge.  “She 
was in her own home. She did not ask the police 
officer in and ... the police officer’s accompanying 
her around the home and the actions outside  of 
the home in full public view in a  residential 
neighbourhood are serious.”  Finally, the judge 
found there were other methods available to obtain 
the information such as by obtaining a search 
warrant. After considering  the three lines of inquiry 
in the s. 24(2) analysis, the judge found admitting 
the evidence  would undermine the long term 
repute of the administration of justice. The accused 
was found not guilty of refusing the ASD demand 
and driving while impaired.
Saskatchewan Court of Queen’s Bench
A crown challenge to the  trial judge’s 
ruling was rejected. The appeal judge 
concluded that the trial judge made no 
error finding a s. 8 breach in applying 
R. v. Rogers. As for s. 24(2), the appeal judge 
upheld the trial judge’s exclusion of the evidence. 
The trial had judge properly considered and 
applied s. 24(2) principles. The Crown’s appeal was 
dismissed. 
Saskatchewan Court of Appeal
The Crown sought leave  to 
appeal (1) a reconsideration of 
R. v. Rogers and the trial 
judge ’s f i nd ing tha t the 
accused’s rights under s. 8 of the Charter had been 
infringed and (2) whether the appeal judge erred by 
upholding the trial judge’s decision to exclude the 
evidence. The Court of Appeal, however, only  felt it 
necessary  to resolve  the appeal on the s. 24(2) 
issue. It rejected the need to reconsider R. v. Rogers 
while at the same time recognized it was not 
foreclosing the Crown from raising the issue again 
in a future case.
s. 24(2) - Exclusion of Evidence
Chief Justice Richards, delivering the opinion of the 
Court of Appeal, first outlined a number of basic 
principles relevant to the s. 24(2) enquiry:
• “Section 24(2) of the Charter speaks to the 
exclusion of evidence obtained by virtue of an 
infringement or denial of a Charter right or 
freedom.”
• “The burden of proof under s. 24(2) – the 
burden of proving that the administration of 
justice would be brought into disrepute by the 
admission of the evidence – is on the party 
seeking the exclusion of the evidence. The 
applicable standard of proof is ‘balance of 
probabilities’. However, matters beyond the 
primary facts such as the degree  of the 
What Rogers Said
“The investigation of the crime of drinking and 
driving, or a similar offence, necessarily entails the 
potential to obtain evidence from conversing with 
or observing the person answering the door. 
Nonetheless, based on my review of the authorities, 
I have concluded that if a trial judge finds on all 
of the evidence a police officer knocked on the door 
to a residence for the purpose of securing evidence 
against the occupant, the officer is conducting a 
search within the meaning of s. 8 of the Charter. 
This principle applies equally to drinking and 
driving offences as well as to other offences where 
observing the person opening the door will give 
visual, auditory and olfactory clues about the 
person’s participation in the crime under 
investigation.” - Justice Jackson in R. v. Rogers, 
2016 SKCA 105 at para. 29. 
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seriousness of Charter-infringing conduct are 
‘not susceptible’ of proof in the ordinary  sense 
but are issues of normative characterization.”
• “A judge faced with a s. 24(2) application 
should have regard to (a) the seriousness of the 
Charter-infringing state conduct, (b) the impact 
of the breach on the Charter-protected 
interests of the accused, and (c)  society’s 
interest in the adjudication of the case on the 
merits. The judge’s role is to balance these 
considerations to determine whether, 
considering all of the circumstances, the 
admission of the evidence would bring the 
administration of justice into disrepute.”
• “If a trial judge has considered the proper 
factors under s. 24(2) and has not made any 
error of principle or unreasonable finding, 
‘appellate courts should accord considerable 
d e f e r e n c e t o h i s o r h e r u l t i m a t e 
determination’. Appellate  courts may conduct 
the trial judge’s s. 24(2) analysis anew if it is 
tainted by  errors of fact or law that are 
relevant to the  trial judge’s ultimate 
conclusion.” [references omitted, paras. 29-32]
The Seriousness of the Breach
Chief Justice Richards concluded that the Charter-
infringing conduct “was not nearly as serious as 
the trial judge believed”:
Even if [the Constable’s] entry into [the 
accused’s] home cannot be split away from 
what happened on the doorstep as clearly and 
completely as the Crown suggests, I 
nonetheless find that the trial judge erred by 
failing to have regard for the particular nature 
of the “entering the house” part of what 
happened on the night in question. In this 
regard, it is important to note that [the 
Constable] formed the intention to make an 
ASD demand while she was still on the 
doorstep. Indeed, after speaking to [the 
accused], smelling alcohol, noting the glossy 
eyes and slow speech, [the officer] went so far 
as to advise [the accused] that she would be 
making an ASD demand. It is reasonable to 
think that she proceeded in this way, i.e., 
delayed in making a formal demand, because 
[the accused] was holding a young child. 
When [the officer] did go into [the accused’s] 
home, she did not enter for the purpose of 
conducting an investigation or gathering 
“The burden of proof under s. 24(2) – the burden of proving that the 
administration of justice would be brought into disrepute by the admission of the 
evidence – is on the party seeking the exclusion of the evidence. The applicable 
standard of proof is ‘balance of probabilities’.”
Seriousness            
of the                    
Charter-infringing 
state conduct
Impact of the breach 
on the accused’s 
Charter-protected 
interests
Society’s interest in 
the adjudication of 
the case                 
on the merits
s. 24(2) Balancing
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evidence. Rather, she followed [the accused] 
into the house as [the accused] attempted to 
find the nanny. The Constable did this to ensure 
that [the accused] did not consume something 
that would interfere with the ASD test. When 
[the accused] found the nanny and transferred 
the child to her, [the Constable] immediately 
made the ASD demand. All of this could not 
have taken more than a very few minutes at 
most and the transcript suggests [the officer] 
conducted herself throughout in a way that was 
fully professional. Seen in context, therefore, 
there was no search or investigative dimension 
to [the Constable’s] entry into the house. It was 
an entry aimed at ensuring the integrity of an 
ASD sample which had been referred to on the 
doorstep but not formally demanded. [The 
accused] does not suggest that there was 
anything improper, in and of itself, about [the 
Constable] acting for this purpose. She takes 
exception only to the fact that the Constable 
entered her home.
In my respectful view, even assuming for the 
sake of argument that the trial judge, and the 
appeal judge in turn, were entitled to consider 
the entry into [the accused’s] home as part of 
the s. 24(2) analysis, they erred nonetheless by 
failing to see that entry in its full context. Not 
all police entries into a home are alike. Here, 
the trial judge appears to have taken no 
account of the specific reason why [the 
Constable] went into the house. Second, she 
overlooked the fact that no evidence was 
sought or obtained by way of the entry. Third, 
the trial judge paid no regard to how [the 
Constable] conducted herself while in the 
house or to the unusual circumstance presented 
by the presence of the child. When all of this is 
taken into account, it can be seen that, even if 
[the Constable’s] entry into the house can be 
seen as being relevant to the seriousness of the 
Charter breach, it did not meaningfully elevate 
its seriousness.
The Crown also submits that the trial judge put 
a second irrelevant matter on the scale in 
considering the seriousness of the Charter-
infringing conduct. This was the arrival of other 
officers on the scene, the placing of [the 
accused] in handcuffs at the police car and the 
request that she go to the police station. The 
t r i a l j udge found a l l o f t h i s “more 
object ionable” than [ the Constable’s] 
attendance at [the accused’s] door and her 
entry into her home.
Once again, and with respect, this analysis 
involved an error in principle. The issue before 
the trial judge was whether evidence obtained 
in a manner that infringed the Charter should 
be excluded. As noted, the Charter breach in 
issue occurred on the doorstep and, perhaps 
arguably, when [the Constable] briefly entered 
[the accused’s] house. [The accused] being 
handcuffed was entirely disconnected from any 
conduct said to have infringed the Charter; it 
cannot be seen as having amplified the 
seriousness of the Charter breach in issue. 
Handcuffing [the accused] might not have been 
necessary and it might have embarrassed her 
but it did not make the police conduct said to 
have breached the Charter either more or less 
serious. It was simply not relevant to the first 
line of inquiry ... . [paras. 46-49]
Here, the officer “was motivated to knock on [the 
accused’s] door by  a concern that an impaired 
driver, with a child on board, might be on the 
street.” As well, the officer believed that her 
actions in questioning the accused on her doorstep 
was acceptable police  procedure. Finally, following 
the accused into her home “did not materially 
impact the significance of the Charter breach in 
issue.”  These considerations reduced the need for a 
court to disassociate  itself from the police  conduct. 
As a result, the Charter-infringing conduct did not 
meaningfully favour excluding the evidence.
The Impact of the Breach
The Court of Appeal found the trial judge also erred 
in her consideration of the impact of the  breach on 
the accused’s Charter-protected interests. The trial 
judge applied concerns not relevant to the  extent 
that the  breach undermined the accused’s s. 8 
protected interest such as the way in which she was 
handcuffed, and how she was otherwise  treated at 
the police car on the street. Chief Justice Richards, 
in finding the breach’s impact did not significantly 
suggest the evidence should be excluded, 
commented: 
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The breach that is in issue here, as per Rogers, 
featured [the Constable] asking [the accused] 
where she had come from and [the accused] 
responding that she had come from the 
7-Eleven, and [the Constable] making 
observations about [the accused’s] slow speech, 
glossy eyes and about the smell of alcohol that 
emanated from her. [The accused] could not 
have had anything but a low expectation of 
privacy in any of that. Just minutes before, she 
had been at the 7-Eleven and there had 
revealed to the world, so to speak, the various 
symptoms that suggested she was intoxicated. 
[The accused] had also driven in full public 
view and, by virtue of that, could have had 
little or no expectation that the fact of her 
driving would be private. She voluntarily 
opened the door when [the Constable] knocked 
and, on the doorstep, she voluntarily answered 
[the Constable’s] questions and revealed the 
various indicia of impairment that led to the 
ASD demand. [The accused] did have a high 
expectation of privacy in relation to the interior 
of her home but, at the same time, [the 
Constable’s] entry into it had no investigative, 
search or information-gathering purpose or 
consequence. [para. 58]
Society’s Interest in Adjudication
The Court of Appeal accepted the Crown’s 
submission that the trial judge substantially  and 
incorrectly considered the idea that the police 
could have  obtained judicial authorization to knock 
on the accused’s door and question whoever might 
have opened it. “There is no provision in the 
Criminal Code that would have permitted the 
police  to have gone forward in the way the trial 
judge believed they should have proceeded,” said 
Chief Justice Richard. The evidence obtained by 
police was reliable and important to the 
prosecution of the case. Society’s interest in an 
adjudication of the case on its merits, however, did 
not strongly favour the admission or exclusion of 
the evidence one way or the other.
Admission or Exclusion?
Since the trial judge erred in her examination of all 
three  s. 24(2) factors, her final balancing of these 
factors and ruling that the evidence should be 
excluded was also in error. Hence, the Queen’s 
Bench judgement in deferring to or adopting the 
trial judge’s conclusion was also an error. As such, 
a redo of the s. 24(2) balancing was required by the 
Court of Appeal. In doing so, Chief Justice  Richards 
found the accused had not met her burden of 
establishing that the admission of the evidence 
gained by the officer on the doorstep would bring 
the administration of justice into disrepute. He 
wrote:
[The Constable] was acting in exigent-type 
circumstances in that she had a report of an 
impaired driver and was concerned that the 
driver, with a young child as a passenger, was 
out on the streets. Her actions were not 
arbitrary. She went to [the accused’s] home on 
the basis of information that the vehicle in 
question was registered to a company bearing 
[the accused’s] name. [The Constable] 
knocked on the door. [The accused] voluntarily 
opened the door and engaged in a conversation 
wherein she indicated that she had just come 
from the 7-Eleven store and revealed signs of 
impairment. [The accused] herself had put all 
of that information into the public domain just 
moments before. [The Constable] believed she 
was acting lawfully.
Having obtained information that entitled her 
to make a lawful ASD demand, [the Constable] 
advised [the accused] that she was going to 
make such a demand. At that point, as [the 
accused] looked to deal with her child, [the 
Constable] followed her into the house with the 
limited objective of ensuring that she did not 
consume something that would corrupt the 
ASD test. That entry had no investigative or 
evidence-gathering purpose. Once the child 
had been dealt with, [the Constable] 
immediately made the formal ASD demand. 
[paras. 69-70]
The Crown’s appeal was allowed, the acquittal on 
the charge of refusing an ASD demand was set 
aside, and a conviction was entered. The matter 
was remitted to Saskatchewan Provincial Court for 
sentencing.
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Seasonal impact on case initiation
There is little seasonal impact on most types of 
criminal court cases. However, seasonality 
does impact the initiation of cases involving 
disturbing the peace.
Cases involving disturbing the peace are more 
likely to be initiated in court in the summer 
months (July and August) than in the winter 
months (from December to March).
There are more case starts than case completions at certain times of the year. For example, 
in July, initiated cases were higher than the yearly average and case completions were 
lower.
1. “Caseload” refers to the average number of cases open on any given day in the month. 
2. The number of court appearances per day has been standardized to business days in a month.
Note: Canada excluding Quebec. Data for Quebec are not available in the Integrated Criminal Court Survey Workload Time Series (ICCS WTS) Database until the 
2015/2016 reference period.
Compared with the yearly average, December (-8.3%) had the lowest 
number of court appearances per day.2 This was followed by the 
summer months of June (-3.9%), August (-2.9%) and July (-2.5%). 
In contrast, April (+4.2%) and September (+3.9%) saw the highest 
number of court appearances per day. 
September had the highest 
criminal court caseload1 (averaging 
190,456 cases over the reference 
period).
June had the lowest caseload 
(averaging 182,965 cases over the 
reference period).
Average monthly caseload in adult criminal court, by month, Canada, 2008/2009 to 2018/2019
In a typical year…
Seasonal influence on court appearances 
Average number of initiated and completed cases in adult criminal court, by month, Canada, 
2008/2009 to 2018/2019
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ABILITY TO APPLY FOR 
WARRANT NOT TO BE 
CONFUSED WITH 
REQUIREMENT TO DO SO
R. v. Ibrahim, 2021 MBCA 12                 
A p o l i c e s e r g e a n t r e c e i v e d 
information from an informer that the 
accused, who the  police knew was a 
member of a  local street gang, was 
staying in a  hotel room, which he 
was using as a base to distribute drugs, and was 
using a black car.  The informer further indicated 
that another gang member (Libanos) was staying at 
the same hotel, was related to the drug 
i n v e s t i g a t i o n a n d w a s d r i v i n g a  J e e p 
Cherokee. Follow-up investigation included:
• Surveillance at the hotel observed a person 
matching the accused’s description exiting a 
black car and entering into the hotel.  
• Inquiries with the hotel staff revealed the 
accused was a registered guest and was driving 
a Chrysler.  
• A licence plate check of the black vehicle which 
the accused had been driving confirmed that it 
was a Chrysler 300 whose registered owner was 
a family member of the accused with the same 
last name and the same address that was 
previously provided to the police by the accused 
as being his address.
• Police checks confirmed that Libanos was a 
registered guest at the hotel and was the 
registered owner of the Cherokee.
As a  result, the sergeant instructed another officer 
to prepare search warrants for the two hotel rooms 
registered to the accused and Libanos. When police 
set up surveillance at the hotel the following 
evening, the Chrysler 300 was not present but the 
Cherokee was in the parking lot and occupied by a 
male in the driver’s seat.  A BMW,  registered to a 
person with the same last name and address as the 
accused, entered the parking lot and then left, 
driving to a residential street.  
At the same time, a Nissan Maxima driven by 
another gang member (Frangi) drove into the hotel 
parking lot and parked beside the Cherokee. The 
sergeant knew that Frangi had a pending charge of 
possession for the purpose of trafficking. He also 
knew the accused was on an undertaking not to 
have any contact with Frangi. The Nissan left the 
parking lot but the police did not have enough 
surveillance units to follow it.
While police  followed the BMW, they determined 
that it was being driven by the accused. The BMW 
proceeded down the residential street and stopped 
for a couple of minutes. It then went further down 
the street toward the end of the block and stopped 
directly  behind a parked vehicle, the Chrysler 300 
that the accused had been driving the previous 
night. The accused exited the BMW, walked to the 
passenger side of the Chrysler 300 and remained 
there  for about a minute. The police were  not able 
to see if the door to the Chrysler 300 was opened 
or if the accused removed anything from it.
Aware of a growing trend, over the last three years, 
that individuals selling drugs would stash them in 
vehicles which they would then park  on residential 
streets to avoid police detection, the sergeant 
believed - based on his experience and the 
accused’s actions - that the accused had committed 
a drug  transaction. He then ordered that the 
accused arrested.  But before  a team of officers 
could make it to the  accused’s location in time to 
arrest him, he got back into the BMW. He drove up 
the back lane of the residential street, around the 
block, and stopped a second time on the residential 
street at the other end of the block away from the 
Chrysler 300.  The Nissan, driven by Frangi, then 
parked in front of the BMW and Frangi got out and 
entered the  BMW with the accused. Believing that 
the drug transaction was continuing, the sergeant 
again ordered that the accused be arrested. Police 
activated their lights and sirens in an attempt to 
stop the BMW. But the accused fled in the BMW 
with the police in pursuit. At one point, Frangi 
exited the BMW and ran off on foot. 
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The accused eventually abandoned the BMW and 
ran from the police, but he was caught and 
arrested. When he was searched, police found 
$995 in cash and keys to the Chrysler 300. No 
drug-related items were located on a quick search 
of the BMW. Police found the Cherokee occupied 
by Frangi and Libanos, and both were arrested. 
Police returned to the Chrysler 300 parked on the 
residential street and searched it. The search 
revealed an empty prescription box in the 
accused’s name and about one kilogram of 
cocaine. It was packed in several bags inside the 
glovebox.
Manitoba Provincial Court
The accused conceded that the police 
had reasonable grounds to arrest him 
for possessing drugs for the purpose of 
trafficking. He also accepted that the 
search of his person, as well as the BMW, was 
conducted incidental to his arrest.  However, he 
argued that the search of the Chrysler 300 was not 
lawful as a search incident to his arrest and, 
therefore, an unreasonable search and seizure 
under s. 8 of the Charter.
The sergeant testified that because the accused had 
a significant amount of cash on him when he was 
arrested furthered his belief that a drug transaction 
had occurred. In the sergeant’s view, he had 
reasonable grounds to believe that there was 
evidence in the Chrysler 300 regarding the offence 
of possession for the purpose of trafficking.
The judge found that the accused had a reasonable 
expectation of privacy in the Chrysler 300 sufficient 
to afford him standing  to raise a s. 8 Charter claim. 
But she held the warrantless search of the Chrysler 
300 was incidental to the accused’s arrest.  She 
rejected the accused’s argument that the Chrysler 
300 was not in his immediate surroundings at the 
time of the search. The judge also found that there 
was a reasonable  prospect that drugs would be 
discovered in the Chrysler 300.   She held that the 
search was not only conducted to discover 
evidence, but also to preserve any evidence that 
might have been found in the vehicle and to ensure 
the safety of police and others.
The accused was convicted of possessing  cocaine 
for the  purpose of trafficking, possessing proceeds 
of crime, failure to stop a motor vehicle while 
being pursued by  police, breach of an undertaking 
and driving while suspended under Ontario’s 
Highway Traffic Act.  
 
Ontario Court of Appeal
The accused argued, in part, 
that the trial judge erred in her 
determination that the search 
of the Chrysler 300, which 
resulted in the seizure of the cocaine, did not 
violate his s. 8 Charter right.  In his view, the trial 
judge erred in finding the Chrysler 300 was within 
his immediate  surroundings at the time of the 
search. In addition, the accused submitted that the 
trial judge mistakenly concluded that there was an 
objectively reasonable prospect that a search of the 
Chrysler 300 would afford evidence of drug 
trafficking. He contended there was no reason why 
the police could not have simply guarded the 
Chrysler 300 until they were able to obtain a search 
warrant. The accused suggested his conviction for 
possessing the cocaine for the purpose of trafficking 
could not stand. 
Search Incident to Arrest
The accused argued that the location of the 
Chrysler 300, being down the block from where the 
police attempted to arrest him and even further 
from the place where he was actually arrested, did 
not meet the requirement that the place searched 
was within the immediate surroundings of his 
arrest.  
Justice Cameron, in examining whether the search 
was lawful and reasonable pursuant to the  common 
law authority of search incident to arrest, first 
reviewed the nature and scope of this power as it 
has developed in the case law including the spatial 
and temporal requirements of this power. In this 
regard, the Court of Appeal concluded that “the 
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jurisprudence confirms that the spatial and 
temporal requirements for search incident to 
arrest, including the concept of immediate 
surroundings, are informed by the legitimate 
police  objectives of such a search.”  It was also 
noted that “delay and dis tance do not 
automatically preclude a search from being 
incident to arrest.” Instead, “the issue of 
immediate surroundings involves consideration of 
the entire constellation of the  facts or the 
context.” In recognizing the continuous nature of 
the offence, the location of the  place searched and 
the timing of the arrest, the trial judge’s finding that 
the Chrysler 300 was within the accused’s 
immediate surroundings was upheld: 
 
Viewed cumulatively and in context, the 
information that the police possessed and the 
observations that they had made objectively 
support [the sergeant’s] subjective belief that 
what police observed from the time that the 
accused initially parked on the residential street 
and approached the Chrysler 300 until the time 
that they activated their lights and sirens to 
arrest him, constituted an ongoing offence and 
that evidence of that offence would be found in 
the Chrysler 300. 
In my view, the effective time and place of the 
arrest occurred when the police pulled up 
behind the BMW and activated their lights and 
sirens — not when [the sergeant] first 
determined that the accused should be 
arrested.  However, the fact that the accused 
was at the Chrysler 300 within minutes of his 
arrest and simply drove around the block where 
another suspected individual joined him before 
the attempted arrest occurred, cannot be parsed 
out from the continuous nature of the offence 
that involved the Chrysler 300.  In my view, the 
entire crime scene encompassed the location of 
both the BMW and the Chrysler 300 and was, 
therefore, within the immediate surroundings of 
the accused.  That is, the Chrysler 300 was 
spatially and temporally connected to the 
offence and to the accused, who it could 
reasonably be believed was in the course of 
committing a drug-related offence when the 
police, by activating their lights and sirens, 
attempted to arrest him.  The purpose of the 
search was to discover evidence of that 
offence. [para. 65-66]
The Court of Appeal also concluded the trial judge 
did not err in holding that the police observed the 
accused driving the Chrysler 300 on the night 
before his arrest.  “The vehicle matched the 
description provided in the  informant information, 
the person who was driving the vehicle  matched 
the description of the accused, the accused was 
seen at the hotel where  it had been confirmed that 
he was staying and had listed the  Chrysler 300 as 
his vehicle and that it was registered to someone 
with the same last name as his and living at the 
same address,”  said Justice Cameron. “In any 
event, the identification of the  accused as the 
driver of the Chrysler 300 on the night prior to the 
arrest is of relative insignificance considering that 
the police identified him as being at the  vehicle 
just prior to his actual arrest. In addition, he had 
the keys to the Chrysler 300 on his person at the 
time of his arrest. In my view, that information 
was sufficient to connect the accused to the 
Chrysler 300.”
Evidence Discovery
As for whether the  discovery of evidence was a 
valid objective of the  search, Justice Cameron 
stated:
The accused also argues that there was no 
informant information establishing that he was 
using the “black car” for the purpose of 
trafficking drugs, thereby negating the purpose 
“Delay and distance do not automatically preclude a search from being incident to 
arrest.”
“The requirement for a valid police purpose to search does not equate to the 
requirement for independent reasonable and probable grounds to search. “
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of the search, being for the discovery of 
evidence. I disagree. A consideration of the 
totality of the evidence, including the accused’s 
behaviour in relation to the Chrysler 300 on the 
night in question, the informant information in 
general, the knowledge of the police regarding 
the use of cars by gang members to stash drugs 
on residential streets, and the flight of the 
accused while in the company of a person 
believed to be involved in drug trafficking, 
objectively established that the search to 
discover evidence was valid.  The requirement 
for a valid police purpose to search does not 
equate to the requirement for independent 
reasonable and probable grounds to search. 
[reference omitted, para. 78]
Evidence Preservation 
Since the search of the Chrysler 300 was valid to 
discover evidence, it was not necessary for the 
Court of Appeal to determine whether preservation 
of evidence was a further valid objective of the 
search. Nevertheless, the Court of Appeal 
considered the accused’s argument that 
preservation of evidence was not a valid objective 
since the police had the ability to guard and/or tow 
the Chrysler 300 during the time that it would have 
taken for them to apply for and obtain a warrant to 
search the vehicle. 
“The problem with the accused’s argument on the 
facts of this case is that it conflates the ability of 
the  police to apply for a  warrant with the 
requirement for a warrant,” said Justice Cameron, 
finding a warrant was not required. “Police do not 
require a warrant to conduct a search incidental to 
a lawful arrest for the valid police purpose of 
preserving evidence, regardless of whether they 
have the ability to apply for a  warrant or preserve 
evidence pending the outcome of their 
application.”  
Since there was no Charter breach, there was no 
need to conduct a s. 24(2) analysis.
The accused’s appeal was dismissed.
Complete case available at www.canlii.org
DESTROYED ITEMS RESULTS IN 
EXCLUSION OF CRITICAL 
EVIDENCE 
R. v. Hillier, 2021 ONCA 180
A uniformed officer approached the 
accused walking on the street. The 
officer intended to arrest the accused 
on a warrant for driving under 
suspension, but he ran away. The 
officer gave chase and grounded the accused in a 
pool of water. The accused had grabbed his 
waistband, refused to surrender his hands and a 
struggle ensued. The  officer was able to control the 
accused, cuffing him to the rear and sitting him up. 
The accused was sopping wet. He told officers he 
had something in his sock. It turned out to be a 
prescription pill bottle containing drugs mixed with 
fentanyl.
Other officers arrived on scene and conducted a 
safety search. Cell phones, lighters, and cash were 
found on the  accused’s person. The accused’s 
shoulder bag was also searched; multiple non-
functional cell phones and cigarette packs were 
located, but no drugs. After complaining of 
shoulder pain, the accused was double-cuffed to 
take pressure off his shoulder and he was placed in 
the back of a police car. He was then driven to the 
“The problem with the accused’s argument on the facts of this case is that it 
conflates the ability of the police to apply for a warrant with the requirement for a 
warrant. Police do not require a warrant to conduct a search incidental to a lawful 
arrest for the valid police purpose of preserving evidence, regardless of whether 
they have the ability to apply for a warrant or preserve evidence pending the 
outcome of their application.”  
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police station. At the station, police noticed a  bulge 
in his mouth. This turned out to be a  larger than 
golf ball size  mass of drugs wrapped in plastic 
weighing 28 grams. The rear of the police car was 
also searched and a  black pouch holding more 
drugs and baggies was found in the rear seat area at 
the footwell. Other evidence was also recovered. 
No photos were taken before the items were seized 
from the cruiser. 
The drugs were turned over to an exhibit officer. He 
decided to destroy some of the seized items he felt 
were a biohazard and not significant to the 
investigation, such as the pouch and coins inside it, 
all of the drug packaging material, and a vial of 
suspected cannabis oil. None of these items were 
tested for fingerprints, nor were photos taken before 
the items were destroyed. The accused was charged 
with numerous drug offences and breach of 
probation.
Ontario Court of Justice
Two officers gave differing evidence 
about their inspection of the police car 
before starting their shift. One said both 
officers inspected the car including the 
footwell without the aid of a flashlight. This officer 
also said he examined the footwell just before  the 
accused entered the car to ensure there was no 
contraband. The other officer said his practice was 
to crouch down to check the footwell with a 
flashlight as part of his daily inspection. But he 
made no note of doing such a check on this day. 
He also said, “as the doors open, I look in to make 
sure nothing is there and then ask the person to 
get in”. Both testified that the accused was the first 
person in their police car that day. The exhibit 
could not provide a reason for not fingerprinting or 
taking photos of the  evidence he destroyed and he 
acknowledged in hindsight it ought to have been 
retained.
As for the pouch, it was described differently by all 
three officers:
1. A black pouch similar in size to a fanny pack 
but unknown how it opened or was fastened;
2. A small black change purse, made of “felt-type 
material”, with a clasp opening at the top, just 
large enough to hold change and a small 
amount of cash. It measured three inches long, 
by three inches tall by 3/4 inch thick.
3. Sort of brown, the size of a female clutch, eight 
inches in rectangular shape, but unknown how 




• Pill bottle in his sock containing 5.53 grams 
of a heroin, fentanyl, and meth mix (along 
with other substances).
 
In the accused's mouth:
• Ball wrapped in plastic containing 28.18 
grams of a heroin, fentanyl, and meth mix 
(along with other substances).
In the police car:
• 9.96 grams of  meth;
• 1.46 grams of  meth;
• 12.9 gras of  oxycodone pills. 
Destroyed Evidence
From the rear of  the police car:
• The pouch found in the rear of the police 
car.
• $9.70 in coins in the pouch believed to be 
covered in an illicit substance.
• A vial of  suspected cannabis oil.
• All of the drug packaging including a bag 
with multiple dime baggies inside, unused 
baggies from the black pouch, and multiple 
baggies with residue found both in the black 
pouch and loose in the cruiser.
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The accused testified in his own defence. He said 
he was an addict and admitted he had drugs in his 
sock. As for the drugs in his mouth, the accused 
said he was leaning forward in the police car to 
relieve the  pressure on his injured shoulder when 
he found a bag, about 6-8 inches long and 3 inches 
high, in a puddle of water at his feet. Curious, he 
picked it up, unzipped it and a white ball wrapped 
in white plastic fell out along with other items. He 
then put the ball in his mouth because he didn’t 
want to get caught with it. 
The accused sought a stay of proceedings on the 
basis that his rights under ss. 7 and 11(d) of the 
Charter were breached because the destroyed 
evidence was relevant and highly probative. In his 
view, its loss prejudiced his right to make full 
answer and defence, and infringed his right to a fair 
trial. In the alternative  to a stay, he  sought the 
exclusion of the evidence found in the cruiser. 
The judge rejected the accused’s submission and 
convicted him of possessing drugs for the purpose 
of trafficking x 5 and breach of probation x 2. He 
was sentenced to eight years in prison. 
Ontario Court of Appeal
The accused challenged his 
convictions, arguing the trial 
judge erred. The Court of 
Appeal agreed, concluding the 
police failed in their obligation to preserve the 
evidence and its destruction, which resulted from 
unacceptable negligence, impaired the accused’s 
right to make full answer and defence protected by 
ss. 7 and 11(d) of the  Charter. “In this case, the 
police  did not take reasonable steps to preserve 
the evidence,”  said Justice Nordheimer for the 
Court of Appeal. “To the contrary, the  police 
purposely destroyed the evidence and did so 
without taking any photographs of it. The officer 
who destroyed the evidence said that he did so 
because ‘[he] just didn’t see the significance in 
keeping them’. But the officer then fairly added, ‘If 
I could do it again, I would have kept the brown 
purse’.” Justice Nordheimer added:
The fact that the officer considered the items to 
be a biohazard did not justify their destruction. 
The police routinely handle all sorts of items 
that could be considered biohazards, but that 
fact does not justify their destruction. Drugs 
themselves are biohazards, but they must be 
retained in order to prove the offences charged. 
Indeed, the officer acknowledged that these 
items could have been saved until the court 
proceedings concluded. [para. 30]
In this case, the trial judge did not properly  analyze 
the significance of the items that were  destroyed. 
Two officers could not agree on who searched the 
police car or how it was done, let alone who was 
the driver that day. And all three officers provided 
different descriptions of the pouch, which was the 
apparent source of the drugs and other items found 
in the back of the police car and in the accused’s 
mouth. The accused had also been thoroughly 
searched at the scene before being placed in the 
car and was handcuffed to the rear:
Charter of Rights
s. 7 Everyone has the right to life, liberty and security of 
the person and the right not to be deprived thereof 
except in accordance with the principles of 
fundamental justice.
s. 11 Any person charged with an offence has the right: ... 
(d) to be presumed innocent until proven guilty 
according to law in a fair and public hearing by an 
independent and impartial tribunal.
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In these circumstances, it is problematic how 
an item, like this fabric pouch, could have been 
on the [accused’s] person and yet not be found 
in the course of the search of the [accused]. 
Indeed, it is hard to see how an item, described 
by at least one of the officers as being like a 
“fanny pack”, could have been missed in such 
a search, especially when one considers what 
the [accused] was wearing at the time: fitted 
jeans, a skin-tight shirt, a loose-fitting button-up 
shirt over top, and a small nylon jacket. It is 
also difficult to understand how the [accused] 
could have retrieved this item from where it 
was apparently so well-hidden on his person, 
given he was handcuffed to the rear throughout 
his time in the cruiser. 
In order for the trial judge to properly consider 
the evidence on the issue of the drugs found in 
the rear of the cruiser, it cannot be refuted that 
being able to look at the fabric pouch would be 
of singular significance, especially in light of 
the differing descriptions given by the officers 
of the pouch. If the physical size of the pouch 
would lead to a conclusion that it could not 
realistically have been missed in a search of the 
[accused’s] person, then that fact would have to 
pose a serious question whether the pouch was 
actually in the possession of the [accused]. It 
could certainly raise a reasonable doubt 
regarding that fact. [paras. 33-34]
Had the judge been able to see the pouch, it would 
have assisted in determining  the likelihood that it 
could have been hidden on the accused, which 
would have assisted in evaluating his evidence 
about what happened.  
As a remedy under s. 24(2) of the  Charter, the Court 
of Appeal excluded the evidence found in the 
cruiser, including the  ball of drugs from the 
accused’s mouth. The convictions related to this 
evidence were set aside and acquittals were 
entered. The possession for the purpose of 
trafficking conviction related to the drugs found in 
the accused’s sock at the time of his arrest was 
substituted with a  simple possession conviction. He 
was to be  re-sentenced on this matter. The breach 
of probation convictions were upheld.  
Complete case available at www.ontariocourts.on.ca
ENTRY ONTO PRIVATE 
PROPERTY JUSTIFIABLE
R. v. Crowe, 2021 SKCA 66
At about 2:00 a.m. police received a 
911 call from a house  (House 195) 
located on First Nation land. The 
911 caller requested assistance to 
remove people  from the residence 
who had been drinking. Two officers responded 
and arrived to find the lights to the house 
completely off and its doors were closed. The house 
appeared quiet with nothing going on. But the 
officers saw the tail lights of a vehicle through a 
stand of trees about 30 metres away. They decided 
to investigate whether the  vehicle had anything to 
do with the 911 call. 
The officers drove down a trail -  also described as a 
driveway - towards the vehicle. The lights to the 
vehicle were on and one officer saw it was running 
as evidenced by its exhaust. The officers pulled up 
behind the vehicle, which now had been turned 
off. The accused - the lone occupant - exited the 
vehicle from the driver’s seat. he was staggering 
and was unsteady on his feet. He walked about 10 
feet from the vehicle to another house (House 196) 
where he steadied himself against its outside 
balcony. As an officer approached, he detected a 
“very  strong smell of beverage alcohol” coming 
from the accused’s breath and found he had “very 
“The fact that the officer considered the items to be a biohazard did not justify 
their destruction. The police routinely handle all sorts of items that could be 
considered biohazards, but that fact does not justify their destruction. Drugs 
themselves are biohazards, but they must be retained in order to prove the 
offences charged.”
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slurred speech” when he spoke. And the accused 
had possession of the keys to the vehicle.
The officer formed the opinion that the accused 
was impaired by alcohol and he was arrested, 
handcuffed, searched and placed in the back of the 
police vehicle. A breathalyzer demand was given 
along with the right to counsel and police warning. 
The accused was transported to the police station, 
afforded the opportunity  to call legal counsel and 
he provided breath samples. He was subsequently 
charged with driving while over 80mg% and 
having care and control of a motor vehicle while 
his ability to operate it was impaired by alcohol.
Saskatchewan Provincial Court
The accused alleged the police entered 
private property without lawful 
authority, and breached his s. 8 
(unreasonable search or seizure) and s. 
9 (arbitrary  detention) Charter rights. He claimed 
the “trail” the officers had driven down was private 
property. He said he had been walking from the 
house related to the 911 call (House 195) to a 
neighbouring house (House 196) to ask its 
occupant (his uncle) for a ride home because he 
was too intoxicated to drive. He said he only 
approached his vehicle  to lock it and had no 
intention to drive. 
The judge found the  accused had been detained 
and arrested while  on private property. As for the 
road connecting the two houses, is was a  trail used 
by a water truck to fill tanks on both properties. 
However, the police  officers were responding to a 
911 call, and had approached the  accused’s vehicle 
to determine whether it was connected to the call. 
Having the  authority to investigate a 911 call in 
these circumstances gave the police officers lawful 
authority to enter the private property where the 
accused’s vehicle was located. A new situation 
arose when the accused exited the vehicle, 
staggered and was unsteady on his feet, and spoke 
with slurred speech while smelling of alcohol. The 
officer then had reasonable grounds to arrest the 
accused. Neither his ss. 8 or 9 Charter rights were 
breached and he was convicted of care and control 
of a motor vehicle while his ability to operate it was 
impaired by alcohol. An acquittal was entered on 
the charge of driving while over 80mg%.  
Saskatchewan Court of Appeal
The accused contended that 
the trial judge erred in her 
conclusions. He submitted, in 
part, that the police officers’ 
conduct fell outside their statutory or common-law 
powers or duties when they entered onto private 
property, and that his ss. 8 and 9 Charter rights 
were breached through this unauthorized conduct. 
Police Entry Onto Private Property
The accused argued that the police did not have 
authority to come onto the  neighbouring private 
property to investigate  the 911 call. In his view, the 
police were first required to attend House 195 to 
verify the nature of the 911 complaint and, until 
that was done, they had no authority to broaden 
their investigation to include persons on the 
adjoining property (House 196).
Relying on the Supreme Court of Canada 
judgement in R. v. Godoy, [1999] 1 SCR 311, 
Justice Ryan-Froslie, delivering the Court of Appeal 
decision, found the police were acting within the 
scope of their duties. The scope of a police officer’s 
response to a 911 call will depend on a number of 
“How [a police officers’ common-law authority in responding to a 911 call] is 
exercised must be left in some measure to the reasonable discretion of the police 
officers involved, recognizing that most 911 calls are emergent. In this regard, it is 
important to note that emergency situations are rarely static; they are fluid and 
ever changing. The limit on the police officers’ discretion is that their conduct 
must be justifiable.” 
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factors. These factors include the duty being 
performed, the extent to which some interference 
with individual liberty if necessitated in order to 
perform that duty, the importance of the 
performance of that duty  to the public good, the 
liberty interfered with and the nature and extent of 
that liberty. 
“How [a police officers’ common-law authority in 
responding to a 911 call] is exercised must be left 
in some measure to the reasonable discretion of 
the police officers involved, recognizing that most 
911 calls are  emergent,”  said Justice Ryan-Froslie. 
“In this regard, it  is important to note that 
emergency situations are rarely static; they are 
fluid and ever changing. The limit on the police 
officers’ discretion is that their conduct must be 
justifiable.” But a response  to a 911 call is not 
necessarily limited to only locating the  caller and 
determining their reasons for making the call.
Further, more than one police duty established by 
statute or the common law, with its attendant 
authority and powers, may be engaged at the same 
time. As the Court of Appeal noted, “a police 
officer’s authority to apprehend offenders engaged 
in criminal activity unrelated to a 911 call is not 
displaced by their duty to respond to such a call. 
Those two things coexist.” 
In holding that a police officer’s response to a 911 
call and the duties and powers engaged by that 
response will be informed by  the circumstances 
they find themselves in, Justice Ryan-Froslie stated:
In [the accused’s] case, the trial judge found the 
police officers were justified in approaching 
[the accused’s] vehicle to see if the occupants 
knew anything about the 911 call. It was 
approximately 2:30 in the morning; House 195, 
where the 911 call had emanated from, was 
dark; the doors were shut; and the house was 
quiet. The only sign of life was the tail lights of 
[the accused’s] vehicle, visible behind a stand 
of trees adjacent to House 195. In my view, the 
trial judge did not err by finding the police 
officers’ conduct in approaching [the accused’s] 
vehicle was a legitimate part of their 
investigation into the 911 call. Further, in the 
circumstances as described, it was reasonable 
for the police officers to approach [the 
accused’s] vehicle before knocking on the door 
of House 195. [para. 36]
Unreasonable Search
The accused suggested the police lacked the 
authority to enter onto the private property. 
Therefore, when they entered onto the property, 
arrested him and conducted a search incidental to 
his arrest, his s. 8 Charter rights were violated. 
The Court of Appeal, however, disagreed. First, the 
accused was unable to establish a reasonable 
expectation of privacy respecting the property 
where  he was located. He did not live at House 
196 and it belonged to his uncle. He said he was 
going to the house to ask for a ride home. He was 
nothing more than an uninvited guest. And there 
was no evidence he had any right to, or interest in 
the property. Second, the officers’ conduct in 
merely entering onto the driveway to approach the 
accused’s vehicle did not constitute a search or 
seizure under the Charter.
Arbitrary Detention
The accused argued that he was detained when the 
officers stopped behind his vehicle to investigate. In 
his view, he was psychologically detained at that 
point. The Court of Appeal, however, rejected this 
claim, finding the accused had not been detained 
until his formal arrest:
The police officers did not stop [the accused’s] 
vehicle; they merely parked behind it. There is 
no suggestion in the evidence that [the 
accused’s] vehicle could not be driven away. 
“[A] police officer’s authority to apprehend offenders engaged in criminal activity 
unrelated to a 911 call is not displaced by their duty to respond to such a call. Those 
two things coexist.” 
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There was, therefore, no physical detention. 
The police officers’ purpose in approaching 
[the accused’s] vehicle was to inquire about the 
911 call. They did not suggest they were aware 
of any criminal of fence having been 
committed, and they never claimed to have 
effected an investigative detention ... . Further, 
up until the point when he was arrested, [the 
accused] had not identified any police conduct, 
direction or demand that would have caused a 
reasonable person in his position to conclude 
he or she was not free to go. Following [the 
accused’s] arrest, the breathalyzer demand was 
made. [The accused] does not suggest the 
police officers lacked reasonable and probable 
grounds to make that demand. On the contrary, 
he freely admits he was intoxicated at the time. 
In the circumstances, [the accused’s] s. 9 
Charter rights were not breached, and the trial 
judge did not err in finding that he had not 
been arbitrarily detained. [references omitted, 
para. 54]
The accused’s appeal was dismissed. 
Complete case available at www.canlii.org
NO EXPECTATION OF PRIVACY 
IN CAR RENTAL INFORMATION
R. v. Telfer, 2021 MBCA 38 
In the early morning hours a  Jeep 
Cherokee pulled up beside another 
vehicle. A person rolled down the 
back driver’s side  window of the 
Jeep and fired at least 10 shots from 
a handgun at the other car. Two occupants were hit 
by gunfire. The front seat passenger was struck in 
the head and killed, while the driver was struck in 
the wrist and wounded. The Jeep then sped off.
A witness provided the Jeep’s licence plate number 
to police. A computer query of the Jeep’s plate 
revealed it was registered to Budget Rent A Car.  
Police attended at Budget and spoke with a rental 
agent who identified Paige Crossman as the renter 
of the Jeep.  The accused was listed as an 
authorized driver on the rental contract. The 
accused and Crossman were regular customers of 
Budget and personally known to the rental agent.  
The rental agent provided police  with their names 
and cell phone numbers.  The manager at Budget 
later provided the police with the  driver’s licence 
numbers and credit card numbers that the accused 
and Crossman used to rent vehicles from Budget.  
No production order had been obtained for this 
information.
From the cell phone numbers, the police obtained 
production orders from two telecommunications 
companies and, through that information, were 
able to determine the accused’s residential address. 
When the Jeep was returned to Budget a few days 
later, the police immediately  seized it and obtained 
a search warrant to examine it.   A one-page rental 
document for the Jeep had been left in the 
glovebox. It identified the renter as Crossman, 
showed her driver’s licence number and the 
method of payment as a Mastercard. An 
authorization to intercept private  communications 
was applied for and granted, and evidence was 
obtained. The accused and Crossman were  charged 
with murder and attempted murder.
Manitoba Court of Queen’s Bench
The accused challenged, in part, the 
sub-facial validity of the affidavit which 
formed the basis for the  granting of the 
authorization to intercept. He sought 
the excision of the information that police received 
from Budget without first obtaining prior 
authorization. In his view, he had a  reasonable 
expectation of privacy in the information provided 
by Budget. Hence, his right under s. 8 of the 
Charter had been violated and he wanted the 
intercept evidence excluded under s. 24(2).
The trial judge ruled that there was no reasonable 
expectation of privacy in the rental information 
given to police. The trial judge found that the 
accused had not established a subjective 
expectation of privacy. The Budget information was 
not excised from the affidavit and the accused’s 
application to exclude the intercept evidence was 
dismissed. The accused was convicted of first 
degree murder and discharging a firearm with 
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intent to endanger life. Crossman, however, was 
acquitted of all charges.  While the judge found she 
was the driver of the Jeep at the time of the 
shooting, he was not convinced she intended to 
kill, or that she intended to help the accused to kill.
Manitoba Court of Appeal
The accused argued the trial 
judge erred in finding he had 
no reasonable expectation of 
privacy in the information 
Budget provided to police - his name, driver’s 
licence number, credit card number and cell phone 
number. In his view, its acquisition constituted a 
search under s. 8 of the Charter. And, if his rights 
were breached, the information must be excised 
from the affidavit for the intercept. Since the Budget 
information was so critical to the trial judge’s 
reasons for conviction and so much evidence was 
derived from the Budget information, he wanted a 
new trial.
Reasonable Expectation of Privacy
Justice Pfuetzner, for a unanimous Court of Appeal, 
concluded the trial judge correctly found the 
accused had no reasonable expectation of privacy 
in the information provided to police by Budget.
“The purpose of section 8 of the Charter is to 
protect individuals’ privacy interests from state 
intrusion,” said Justice Pfuetzner. “However, only 
reasonable expectations of privacy are protected. 
If there  is no reasonable expectation of privacy in 
the subject of the state action, then there  is no 
‘search’ for the purposes of section 8 of the 
Charter.  This means that, in assessing an alleged 
breach of section 8 of the Charter, the judge must 
first determine if the individual had a reasonable 
expectation of privacy in the subject of the state 
intrusion.  If not, then section 8 is not engaged.  It 
is only after a reasonable expectation of privacy is 
found to exist that the judge turns to inquire 
whether the search was reasonable.”
In this case, the accused was claiming 
informational privacy in the details provided by 
Budget. In assessing the accused’s submission, the 
following framework was first considered:
• “A reasonable expectation of privacy is a 
normative question.” 
• “The issue then becomes how to determine if a 
claimant has a reasonable expectation of 
privacy.  Broadly  speaking, this is a two-step 
process. First, the judge must determine if the 
claimant has a  subjective expectation of privacy.  
If so, then the judge must assess whether that 
expectation of privacy is objectively reasonable.  
This assessment is made from the perspective of 
‘the reasonable and informed person who is 
concerned about the long-term consequences 
of government action for the protection of 
privacy’.”
• The exercise is contextual and looks at the 
totality of the circumstances. 
 
The Court of Appeal then examined the relevant 
factors set out by the Supreme Court of Canada in 
R. v. Patrick, 2009 SCC 17, to determine whether 
the accused had a reasonable expectation of 
privacy in the information provided by Budget: 
    
• Nature or subject matter of the evidence 
gathered by the police. The evidence gathered 
by police was his name, driver’s licence details, 
“The purpose of section 8 of the Charter is to protect individuals’ privacy interests 
from state intrusion. However, only reasonable expectations of privacy are 
protected. If there is no reasonable expectation of privacy in the subject of the 
state action, then there is no ‘search’ for the purposes of section 8 of the 
Charter. This means that, in assessing an alleged breach of section 8 of the Charter, 
the judge must first determine if the individual had a reasonable expectation of 
privacy in the subject of the state intrusion.  If not, then section 8 is not engaged.”
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cell phone number and credit card number. No 
GPS data was obtained. 
• Did the accused have a direct interest in the 
subject matter? The accused had a direct 
interest in the  Budget information as it related to 
him (name, driver’s licence, cell phone number 
and credit card number).
• Did the  accused have a  subjective expectation 
in the information? The trial judge found the 
accused had not established a subjective 
expectation of privacy. He did not testify at the 
voir dire. Nevertheless, the Court of Appeal 
proceeded as if the accused did have a 
subjective expectation of privacy.
• Was the subjective expectation objectively 
reasonable?  
➡ The place where the alleged “search” 
occurred. The alleged search occurred at 
Budget’s publicly accessible business 
premises.  There was no intrusion on the 
accused’s residence or personal property.
➡ Was the Budget information in public  view? 
Although there was no evidence to indicate 
that the Budget information was on public 
display, the accused’s and Crossman’s 
activities in renting vehicles from Budget 
were conducted essentially in public, as they 
would attend in person to rent and return 
vehicles. Section 22 of Ontario’s Highway 
Traffic Act (HTA) also required Budget’s rental 
records to be accessible by the public.
➡ Was the information already in the hands of 
third parties; If so, was it subject to an 
obligation of confidentiality? While the 
Budget information was obtained from a 
third party, nothing in the  rental agreement’s 
terms and conditions, or the governing 
legislation, made the  information subject to 
an obligation of confidentiality. For example, 
the rental agreement contemplated the 
disclosure of personal information in order to 
“take action regarding illegal activities or 
violations of terms of service”.  The Jeep was 
used in the commission of a homicide which 
would constitute both an illegal activity and 
a violation of the terms of the rental 
agreement. In addition, s. 22 of the HTA 
mandated that rental car businesses keep 
details of the cars they rent, as well as the 
identity  and driver’s licence particulars of the 
renter, available for public inspection.  “In 
the circumstances of this case, I am not 
convinced that any of the Budget 
information was subject to an obligation of 
confidentiality,” said Justice Pfuetzner. “First, 
the [police] obtained the accused’s name as 
a result of the first-hand knowledge of the 
rental agent.  This information was also 
required to be disclosed to any member of 
the public under section 22 of the HTA, as 
were the particulars of the accused’s driver’s 
licence.  Additionally, the one-page rental 
document that was left abandoned inside 
the vehicle  directly linked at least 
Crossman’s name to the  Jeep.  Next, while 
the accused’s cell phone number and credit 
card number are not subject to section 22 of 
the HTA, Budget was entitled to disclose 
them to the [police] under the rental 
agreement in order to ‘take action regarding 
illegal activities’.”  
➡ Whether the police technique was intrusive 
in relation to the privacy interest. The 
information was obtained at Budget’s public 
premises.  There was no intrusion upon any 
place that the accused would consider 
private. Nor was a surreptitious means or 
intrusive technology used to obtain the 
information.  
“First, the judge must determine if the claimant has a subjective expectation of 
privacy.  If so, then the judge must assess whether that expectation of privacy is 
objectively reasonable.” 
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➡ Whether the use of this evidence-gathering 
t e c h n i q u e w a s i t s e l f o b j e c t i v e l y 
unreasonable.  The police  obtained basic 
information from a publicly accessible place 
of business.  The police inquiry focussed on 
the vehicles that had been rented to the 
accused and Crossman.  General access to 
Budget’s records was not sought and this was 
a targeted investigation of a serious crime. 
“Driving is a  highly regulated activity,” said 
Justice Pfuetzner.  “A reasonable and 
informed person would have a reduced 
expectation of privacy in connection with 
the possession and operation of a vehicle.”  
The evidence-gathering technique was not 
objectively unreasonable.
➡ Whether the informational content exposed 
any intimate details of the accused’s lifestyle 
or information of a biographic  nature. The 
Budget information was not highly personal 
in format ion. “It contained nothing 
particularly sensitive or revealing [and] did 
not have the  potential to reveal, or provide a 
link to, intimate details of the lifestyle and 
personal choices of the accused.”  A cell 
phone number does not tend to reveal 
“intimate details of the lifestyle and 
personal choices” of the individual and 
credit card numbers are accessible to anyone 
entitled to do a credit check  on an 
individual.  Under Manitoba’s Personal 
Investigations Act, a credit report is available 
to “any police officer acting in that 
capacity”.
Since the accused did not have a reasonable 
expectation of privacy in the Budget information, 
there  was no s. 8 Charter search. The accused’s 
appeal was dismissed. 
Complete case available at www.canlii.org
REASONABLE GROUNDS LESS 
THEN BALANCE OF 
PROBABILITIES
The Director of Criminal Property and 
Forfeiture v. Ramdath et al, 
2021 MBCA 23                          
Manitoba’s Director of Criminal 
Property and Forfeiture commenced 
an action under Manitoba’s Criminal 
Property Forfeiture Act (CPFA) against 
several defendants resulting from an 
investigation involving the embezzlement of 
millions of dollars. The Director sought an order 
forfeiting certain property. The Director moved for 
an interim preservation order under s. 7(2) of the 
CPFA to freeze funds in a GIC and TFSA in 
Ramdath’s name until a final determination of the 
civil forfeiture proceeding was made. 
Manitoba Court of Queen’s Bench
Although the defendants opposed the 
interim preservation order, the judge 
concluded there were “reasonable 
grounds to believe” that the funds in the 
two bank accounts were proceeds of unlawful 
activity.  The judge found the Director need not 
establish a  “prima facie”  case against the 
defendants, but need only satisfy the court that 
there  are “reasonable grounds to believe” that the 
two bank accounts were proceeds of unlawful 
activity.  
Manitoba Court of Appeal
The defendants argued that 
the motion judge erred in 
o r d e r i n g  t h e i n t e r i m 
preservation of the two bank 
accounts. He submitted the motion judge erred in 
“The issue then becomes how to determine if a claimant has a reasonable 
expectation of privacy. Broadly speaking, this is a two-step process. First, the 
judge must determine if the claimant has a subjective expectation of privacy.  If 
so, then the judge must assess whether that expectation of privacy is objectively 
reasonable.”
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finding that the Director had met the test set out in 
s. 7(2). The Director, on the other hand, asserted 
that the evidentiary foundation required under s. 
7(2) was low and had been met.
Standard of Proof
Section 7(2) of the CPFA reads:
Chief Justice Chartier first described the standard of 
proof, conceptualizing it as follows:
A standard of proof is a test that sets out the 
level of certainty required to establish proof in 
a legal proceeding.  There is a spectrum of 
standards of proof that arises either from 
legislation or from constitutional or common 
law.  Standards of proof fall on a spectrum 
ranging from the most exacting and demanding 
standard to the least: 1) proof beyond a 
reasonable doubt; 2) proof on a balance of 
probabi l i t ies ; 3) a pr ima facie case; 
4)  reasonable grounds to believe; and 5) 
reasonable suspicion.  While there are other 
standards of proof (e.g., a strong prima facie 
case or a serious question to be tried), these are 
the principal ones. [para. 14]
And further:
[W]hen judges make decisions, they must 
decide whether a given set of facts meets the 
required standard of proof or level of certainty 
to make the decision sought. The required 
standard of proof must be properly understood.  
It is easier to conceptualize standards of proof 
than it is to define them. Conceptualization 
identifies a process as opposed to giving a rigid 
and inflexible definition. A process has the 
advantage of being able to adapt to the purpose 
of the legislation and to its underlying values. 
[para. 17]
Balance of Probabilities
... Often overlooked in a discussion of the 
“balance of probabilities” standard is the word 
“balance”, as in a “scale”. The analogy to a 
scale is meant to highlight that central to 
applying the standard is weighing competing 
probabilities to arrive at an outcome.  Further, 
while there is no objective standard to measure 
sufficiency, the evidence must always be 
“sufficiently clear, convincing and cogent to 
satisfy the balance of probabilities test”.
There are several functional equivalents that 
have been used to describe the “balance of 
probabilities” standard.  The standard can also 
be described using the question of whether 
something is “more likely than not”.  Courts 
have also used “more probable than not” or 
“p reponde rance o f p robab i l i t y ” and 
“preponderance of evidence” [references 
omitted, paras. 19-20]
Prima Facie Case
The “prima facie” standard is situated on the 
standard of proof spectrum between “balance 
of probabilities” and “reasonable grounds to 
believe”.   Black’s Law Dictionary defines prima 
facie as “on first appearance but subject to 
further evidence or information”. The term 
“prima facie” is used in several different 
contexts and is somewhat loosely defined.  The 
phrases “prima facie proof”, “prima facie 
evidence” and “prima facie case” have at times 
been used interchangeably, contributing to the 
confusion around what, exactly, is the prima 
facie case standard of proof. 
“Standards of proof fall on a spectrum ranging from the most exacting and 
demanding standard to the least: 1) proof beyond a reasonable doubt; 2) proof on a 
balance of probabilities; 3) a prima facie case; 4) reasonable grounds to believe; 
and 5) reasonable suspicion.”
Unless it would clearly not be in the interests of 
justice, the court must make an order under 
subsection  (1)  if it is satisfied that there are 
reasonable grounds to believe that the property is 
proceeds of unlawful activity or an instrument of 
unlawful activity.
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The Supreme Court of Canada has provided 
helpful guidance on what constitutes a “prima 
facie case” standard in the context of criminal 
law and extradition law. It is a “case containing 
evidence on all essential points of a charge 
which, if believed by the trier of fact and 
unanswered, would warrant [the order 
sought]”. [references omitted, paras. 21-22]
Reasonable Grounds to Believe
... [T]he jurisprudence shows that the 
“reasonable grounds to believe” standard is 
higher than the “reasonable suspicion” 
standard and lower than the “balance of 
probabilities” standard.  The central difference 
between “balance of probabilities” and 
“reasonable grounds to believe” is the absence 
of weighing probabilities in applying the 
“reasonable grounds to believe” standard. The 
latter can exist even in the face of a competing 
probability.  Moreover, the “reasonable grounds 
to believe” standard typically arises when 
dealing with preliminary pre-hearing matters, 
such as search and seizures or arrests and 
detentions, and the “balance of probabilities” 
standard normally applies at the final stage of a 
legal proceeding. [references omitted, para. 28]
Was the Standard of Proof Met?
Chief Justice Chartier was satisfied that there were 
reasonable grounds to believe that the funds in the 
two bank accounts were proceeds of unlawful 
activity. “At the section 7 interim order stage of 
the forfeiture proceedings, the judge is not called 
upon to make final determinations on the 
evidence,”  he  said.  “At that stage, it is not the 
function of the judge to make findings of fact, to 
assess credibility, to prefer some evidence to other 
evidence or to resolve competing inferences.  The 
director must present some evidence on each of 
the section  17.15 elements and the judge will 
review the sufficiency of the evidentiary record 
and decide on the ‘reasonable grounds to believe’ 
standard of proof whether the impugned property 
is proceeds of unlawful activity or an instrument of 
unlawful activity. In making that determination, 
the judge will decide, after considering the 
evidence led, whether there is some evidence 
capable of belief on all required elements. If there 
is, section 7(2) requires the judge to make the 
interim order unless it would clearly not be in the 
interests of justice to do so.”
In this case, there  was some evidence that the funds 
in the two bank accounts were proceeds of 
unlawful activity. The defendant Ramdath had pled 
guilty to defrauding his former employer of more 
than $4 million.  He enjoyed a lavish lifestyle 
beyond what his annual salary would have 
allowed. And there was some evidence that the 
stolen funds were deposited into the TFSA and GIC 
bank accounts. The reasonable grounds standard 
for the interim preservation order had been 
satisfied. And the defendants were unable to 
demonstrate the order “would clearly not be in the 
interests of justice”. 
The defendants’ appeal was dismissed.
Complete case available at www.canlii.org
“[T]he jurisprudence shows that the ‘reasonable grounds to believe’ standard is 
higher than the ‘reasonable suspicion’ standard and lower than the ‘balance of 
probabilities’ standard. The central difference between ‘balance of probabilities’ 
and ‘reasonable grounds to believe’ is the absence of weighing probabilities in 
applying the ‘reasonable grounds to believe’ standard. The latter can exist even in 
the face of a competing probability.”
“[T]he “reasonable grounds to 
believe” standard is higher than 
the ‘reasonable suspicion’ standard 
and lower than the ‘balance of 
probabilities’ standard.” 
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The number of police-reported     
hate crimes increased 7% in 2019.  The 
increase was mostly due to more 
incidents targeting race or ethnicity, 
as well as sexual orientation.
1,414
The majority of police-reported hate crimes were non-violent offences. 
In 2019, 32% of hate crimes were 
motivated by religion.
In 2019, almost all provinces and all 
























In 2019, 46% of all police-reported hate crimes 






























1 Motivations based on race or ethnicity not otherwise stated and those which 
  target more than one group.
1 Includes mental or physical disabilities, 
language, age and other similar factors.
1 Motivations based on religions not otherwise stated.
In 2019, 14% of hate crimes 
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Note: Hate crimes whose type was unknown have been excluded. Therefore, the totals for each type of hate crime shown 
will not add up to the overall total for 2018 and 2019.
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UNEXPLAINED TIME FROM 
CHARGE TO ARREST 
ATTRIBUTABLE TO CROWN 
DELAY
The time it takes to arrest 
an accused after they have 
been charged can be 
counted towards the R. v. 
Jordan, 2016 SCC 27, s. 
11(b) Charter framework. 
In R. v. Virk, 2021 BCCA 
58, a five member panel of 
the BC Court of Appeal has 
upheld the trial judge’s 
attribution of delay from the time a charge was laid 
until the accused was arrested as Crown delay for 
the purposes of deciding whether charges should 
be stayed as a  result of a breach of the right to be 
tried within a  reasonable amount of time 
recognized under s. 11(b). 
In this case, a BC Supreme Court judge stayed 
sexual assault charges after it was determined that 
there  was a net delay  of 57.8 months from the time 
of charge to trial end, which included 140 days 
between the laying of the information and the arrest 
of the accused. The Crown had argued that the 
period between the charge to arrest should be 
deducted from the total delay because the Crown 
did not control when the police executed process 
against an accused. The Court of Appeal, however, 
did not agree. “That is not to say that the time 
between the laying of the information and arrest 
could never be deducted from total delay as a 
discrete event—for example, where there is 
evidence that the police were diligent in their 
efforts to serve process but unable to locate the 
accused, the accused was evading service, or other 
matters in the public interest reasonably 
necessitated a delay in effecting an arrest,” said 
Justice Fenlon for the unanimous Court of Appeal. 
“But that is not this case. The judge found the 
delay between the laying of the information and 
[the accused’s] arrest ‘was not, on the evidence, 
explained or justified’.” 
Complete case available at www.courts.gov.bc.ca
EXPERT EVIDENCE or TEST 
FIRING NOT NECESSARY TO 
PROVE GUN WAS A ‘FIREARM’
Just because there was no expert evidence tendered 
or proof a gun was test fired did not mean the 
Crown had not proven the object was a  “firearm” 
for the purposes of the Criminal Code. In R. v. 
Courchene, 2021 MBCA 24, the accused was 
convicted of break, enter and stealing a firearm. He 
and an accomplice had broken into an unoccupied 
home and stole three rifles, two shotguns and an 
airsoft pistol. The men were  quickly apprehended 
by police and the guns were recovered. However, 
the guns were not examined by an expert nor were 
they test fired. Instead, the Crown relied on the 
evidence of the owner’s relatives to prove the  rifles 
and shotguns were firearms as defined in the 
Criminal Code. The owner’s son-in-law “was 
familiar with firearms from serving in the military, 
he testified as to his personal knowledge of firing 
the guns historically; their storage in his father-in-
law’s gun case or gun safe; his cleaning and 
servicing of the guns to keep them in ‘good 
working order’; and that, save for one of the  rifles 
that was missing a bolt, the other recovered rifles 
and shotguns were in the same condition as when 
he last serviced them in the ‘previous year’.” 
The Manitoba Court of Appeal found the trial judge 
could properly draw inferences as to the condition 
of the  guns from the evidence  of the lay witness 
(the owner’s son-in-law). “The inference that some 
of the stolen guns were ‘firearm[s]’ within the 
meaning of section 2 of the Code was reasonably 
open here in light of the standard of proof,” said 
Justice Mainella for the Appeal Court. “We note 
that the trial judge was careful in his reasons not 
to base his verdict on the damaged rifle or on the 
airsoft pistol (about which he heard little 
evidence).”
Complete case available at www.canlii.org
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CONFINEMENT DID NOT END 
WHEN VICTIM JUMPED FROM 
VEHICLE
 
A murder victim’s desperate bid to 
escape from a  vehicle did not end his 
unlawful confinement such that the 
constructive murder provision under 
the Criminal Code was neutered. In R. 
v. Sundram & Martin, 2021 BCCA 53, the two 
accused were jointly charged with first degree 
murder. The Crown theorized that the murder 
occurred while the men were unlawfully confining 
the victim in a vehicle. They were rival drug 
traffickers. Under s. 31(5) of the Criminal  Code, 
irrespective of whether a murder is planned and 
deliberate  on the part of any person, murder is first 
degree murder if the death is caused while that 
person is committing or attempting to commit a 
number of enumerated offences, including forcible 
confinement. This is known as constructive  murder. 
While the predicate offence of unlawful 
confinement must be linked together temporally 
and causally with the murder, they must be distinct 
and independent of one another. The trial judge 
convicted Suderman of second degree murder 
because  he found a brief gap in time between the 
end of the victim’s confinement and the 
commission of the murder. Just before he was shot, 
the victim jumped out of the vehicle he had been 
confined in and managed to escape. In the judge’s 
view, this momentary gap in time between the 
victim’s escape and being shot ended his 
confinement. Thus, the Crown failed to prove the 
victim was murdered while the accused were 
committing the offence of unlawful confinement. 
On appeal, the trial judge was found to have erred. 
“The unlawful confinement of [the victim] did not 
end with his desperate act of self-preservation by 
jumping from the Silverado,” said Justice Fitch. 
“[The victim] was in no sense free to move about 
according to his own inclination and desire, 
including after he had jumped from the moving 
Silverado and made a run for it at the side of the 
road. His confinement did not, as a matter of law, 
end as soon as he bailed from the truck.” 
Suderman’s acquittal for first degree murder was set 
aside and a finding of guilt was entered. Martin’s 
conviction for second degree murder was upheld 
since he was found not to be a party to the 
confinement. 
Complete case available at www.courts.gov.bc.ca
‘ACCIDENT’ INCLUDES 
INTENTIONALLY STRIKING A 
PEDESTRIAN
A person who intentionally struck a 
pedestrian had been involved in an 
“accident” for the purposes of a hit 
and run offence under the Criminal 
Code. In R. v. Reid, 2021 NLCA 13, 
the accused was convicted of assault with a 
weapon, dangerous driving causing bodily harm 
and failing to stop at the scene of an accident after 
he intentionally drove his vehicle into a pedestrian. 
He admitted he was the driver and did not stop at 
the scene, but he claimed he drove into the 
pedestrian intentionally and therefore  it was no 
“accident”. 
The Newfoundland and Labrador Court of Appeal 
saw it otherwise, rejecting the accused’s submission 
that an “accident”  under the hit and run provision 
did not include something that arose from an 
intentional act. “We see the term ‘accident’ 
colloquially used to describe both intentional and 
unintentional acts,” said Justice Goodridge. 
“Reading section 252 [now s. 320.16] in its entire 
context, and in the manner as directed by the 
Interpretation Act, leads to the conclusion that 
intention of the driver is not an element of 
‘accident’.”  And further, “Within the context of 
section 252, ‘accident’ contemplates any incident 
in which a person operates a vehicle so as to cause 
injury to another person or vehicle, and it includes 
intentional conduct on the part of the accused.”
Complete case available at www.canlii.org
“We see the term ‘accident’ 
colloquially used to describe both 
intentional and unintentional 
acts.”
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NATIONAL DNA DATABANK STATISTICS 
RELEASED
Statistics for Canada’s National DNA Data Bank have been 
released. As at March 31, 2021 there were a total of 73,793 
DNA matches. 
Source: National DNA Data Bank Statistics, accessed April 17, 2021.
Match Inventory Report
Criminal Investigations Hits
Offender Hits -Crime Scene to Offender 66,539
Forensic Hits - Crime Scene to Crime Scene 7,211
Victim Hits - Matches to Victims Index 9
Humanitarian Investigations Hits
Human Remains Hits - Putative Identification 25
Humanitarian Indices Hits - Investigative Lead 9
Total 73,793










DNA Profiles Contained in Criminal Indices
Convicted Offender Index 411,999
Crime Scene Index 184,549
Victims Index 61
Total 596,609
Released April 21, 2021
Alcohol Sales in Canada, 
2019/2020
Beer
341 ml (12 oz.)
5% alcohol content
Wine
142 ml (5 oz.)
12% alcohol content
Spirits
(whisky, gin, rum, etc.)
43 ml (1.5 oz.)
40% alcohol content
Cider/Cooler
341 ml (12 oz.)
5% alcohol content
How Health Canada defines “a drink”:
Number of standard alcoholic drinks sold per week,per person over the legal drinking age
Source:  Control and Sale of Alcoholic Beverages in Canada 
2019-2020.
Beer Cider, Coolerspre-mixed drinksWine Spirits

























































Between April 1, 2019, 
and March 31, 2020, 
governments earned 
an average of $425 
per person over the 
legal drinking age 
from the control and 
sale of alcoholic 
beverages.
Gin was the spirit with
the highest growth in 2019/2020.
Rum, vodka, and whisky are  
the top spirits throughout Canada, 
except in Quebec, where liqueurs 
are the most popular.
Demand for imported spirits has risen 
in recent years
Average alcohol sales in Canada were $810 per person over 
the legal drinking age.  
www.statcan.gc.ca
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While beer remains 
the drink of choice, 
Canadian tastes have 
shifted over time. 
Sales of cider, 
coolers, and gin 
have more than 
doubled in the 
last decade. 
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